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IN RE HOERY v. UNITED STATES: COMPENSATING
HOMEOWNERS FOR LOSS OF PROPERTY VALUE
DUE TO TOXIC POLLUTION UNDER THE
CONTINUING TORT DOCTRINE
I. INTRODucTION
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Recovery Act (CERCLA).1 Com-
monly known as "Superfund," it "confers broad authority upon the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to investigate releases of
hazardous substances and to undertake response actions, or clean-
ups." 2 The highest priority sites are placed on the National Priority
List (NPL) and are eligible for Superfund remediation funds. 3 As
ofJanuary 31, 2003, there were 1,499 sites in the continental United
States.4
Landowners who are in close proximity to a Superfund site fre-
quently experience a loss of property value.5 According to the EPA,
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Recovery
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994) (noting laws enactment).
2. JOHN M. HYSON, PRIVATE COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA 16
(2003) (defining CERCLA).
3. See, e.g., Robert L. Glickman et al., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW AND
POLIcY 841 (2003) (explaining Superfund availability limited to NPL sites) (citing
40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b) (1)).
4. Matt Richtel, E.P.A. Takes Second Look at Many Superfund Sites, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2003, at A26 (reporting current number of Superfund sites). Trichloro-
ethylene (TCE), a chemical solvent, contaminates one-third to one-half of the
sites. Id. A site makes the NPL under the following circumstances:
When faced with the report of a release, EPA undertakes a preliminary
assessment of a site for the purpose of determining the extent to which
the release presents a threat to public health or the environment. EPA
conducts this assessment in accordance with the provisions of the "haz-
ardous ranking system" (HRS), which contains criteria for making a quick
evaluation of the threat presented by contamination at a site. Application
of the HRS produces a "score" for the site. If that score reaches a certain
level, then the site is proposed for inclusion on the ... NPL.
HYSON, supra note 2, at 16.
5. See Environmental Protection Agency, Property Values, Stigma, and Superfund
available at- http://www.epa.gov/cgi-bin/epaprintonly.cgi (last visited Oct. 29,
2003) [hereinafter Property Values] (explaining correlating loss of property value).
Following CERCLA's passage, empirical studies revealed "numerous situations
where property values have been adversely affected, at least temporarily, as well as
situations where adverse affects have not been detected." Karl. L. Guntermann,
Sanitary Landfills, Stigma and Industrial Land Values, 10J. REAL EST. RESEARCH 5, 531
(1995) available at http://www.business.fullerton.edu/journal/papers/pdf/past/
voll0n05/v10p531.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
(35)
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Superfund sites generally reduce off-site residential property values
by two to eight percent.6 Homeowners and other private plaintiffs
seeking to recover economic damages caused by hazardous pollu-
tion face two major obstacles. First, CERCLA does not permit pri-
vate plaintiffs to recover loss in property value; accordingly, private
plaintiffs must seek alternate avenues of recovery. 7 One option is to
seek compensation under state law by asserting a claim for continu-
ing trespass or continuing nuisance under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA).8
Second, many environmental violations occur over an ex-
tended time period and are difficult to discover.9 As a result, plain-
tiffs often learn about potential violations after the two-year statute
of limitations period has run.10 Plaintiffs may counter the statute of
limitations defense by invoking the "continuing tort doctrine." 1
This doctrine permits a plaintiff to "recover for acts which, if viewed
individually, would be time-barred by treating them as part of a pat-
tern of violations or as a single violation."'12 This doctrine is an ef-
fective tool because it allows homeowners to recover economic
damages caused by another individual's hazardous pollution. 13
While in some cases the property values recover after remediation, most
properties never recover because they have become "stigmatized." Property Values,
supra. Generally, stigma is "an adverse public perception that is often intangible or
not quantifiable." Id. In other words, it is "a loss in value because of unspecified
greater perceived risk associated with a property." Guntermann, supra, at 531.
6. See Property Values, supra note 5 (reporting losses in property value).
7. See HYsON, supra note 2, at 191 n.16 (stating CERCLA does not permit re-
covery for economic damages; however, plaintiffs may seek damages under state
law); cf. James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as
Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA.
ENvrL. L.J. 589, 641-51 (1996) (exploring viability of continuing violation doctrine
in environmental penalty cases). Only a few states compensate homeowners for
the loss of property due to contamination. See Compensating Homeowners for Loss of
Property Value Due to Soil Contamination, available at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/
2001/rpt/olr/htm/2001-r-0510.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003). Minnesota and
New Jersey prescribe compensation by statute. See id.
8. See HYsON, supra note 2, at 191 n.16 (recognizing plaintiffs may seek eco-
nomic damages under state law). Under the FTCA, state law controls. Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2004). For further discussion of liability
under the FTCA, see infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
9. See HysON, supra note 2, at 191 n.16 (noting continuous nature of environ-
mental law violations).
10. See id. (acknowledging tension between statute of limitations and nature
of environmental violations); see generally MacAyeal, supra note 7 (addressing diffi-
culty with statute of limitations).
11. See MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 589 (explaining continuing tort doctrine
may overcome statute of limitations defense).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 589, 618-19 (discussing continuing tort
doctrine as means to recover otherwise time-barred acts).
[Vol. XVI: p. 35
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CONTINUING TORT DOCTRINE
The recent case, In re Hoery v. United States,14 illustrates the diffi-
culty that courts face when applying the continuing tort doctrine to
environmental pollution cases.1 5 Nevertheless, the court's reason-
ing and holding provides a good model for other courts when grap-
pling with this issue. 16 In In re Hoery, the Colorado Supreme Court
addressed: (1) whether the continued migration of toxic chemicals
from defendant's property to plaintiffs property constituted con-
tinuing trespass and/or nuisance; and (2) whether the ongoing
presence of toxic chemicals on plaintiff's property constituted con-
tinuing trespass and/or nuisance. 17 The Colorado Supreme Court
answered both questions affirmatively.18
This Note reviews the continuing tort doctrine and how the
Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation presents an alternative
avenue for private plaintiffs to recover economic damages. Part II
details the facts, procedural history and holding of In re Hoery.19
Part III briefly explains CERCLA, the continuing tort doctrine and
pertinent Colorado case law.20 Part IV summarizes the analysis and
14. 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003) (en banc), remanded to 324 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir.
2003).
15. See id. at 227 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (recognizing there is "no clear gui-
dance from other courts or from the commentators").
16. See generally MacAyeal, supra note 7 (averring adoption of continuing tort
doctrine promotes environmental protection); In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 224 (analyz-
ing and summarizing various approaches and underlying rationales within jurisdic-
tional split). The Colorado Supreme Court cited In re Hoery in People v. Thoro Prods.
Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1201 (Colo. 2003). The United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky cited In re Hoery in Smith v. Carbide & Chems. Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 2d 561, 570-71 (2004).
The jurisdictional split is illustrated by In re Hoery's majority and dissenting
opinions. The majority relied on the reasoning of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
and decisions from Washington, Massachusetts and New York. See In re Hoery, 64
P.3d at 221 (citing Nieman v. NLO Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1559 (6th Cir. 1997);
Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, 940 F.2d 1265, 1266 (9th Cir. 1991); In re
ASARCO/Vashon-Maury Island Litig., No. COO-695Z, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7154,
at 11-13 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001); Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Assoc., 763 N.E.2d
1053, 1065 (Mass. 2002); Kulpa v. Stewart's Ice Cream, 144 A.D.2d 205 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988)).
The In re Hoery dissent relied on State Supreme Court decisions from Utah,
Pennsylvania, Louisiana and Alaska. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 224-25 (Kourlis, J.,
dissenting) (citing Brieggar Props, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons Inc., 52 P.3d 1133,
1135 (Utah 2002); Sustrik v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 197 A.2d 44, 46 (Pa.
1964); Crump v. Sabine River Auth., 737 So. 2d 720, 728 (La. 1999); FCIC v.
Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 21 P.3d 344, 356 (Alaska 2001)).
17. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 220 (outlining certified questions).
18. See id. at 223 (answering certified questions affirmatively).
19. For a full discussion of facts and procedural history, see infra notes 24-45
and accompanying text.
20. For a full discussion of CERCLA, see infra notes 46-63 and accompanying
text. For a full discussion of FTCA, see infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
For a full discussion of the continuing tort doctrine as a method to recover eco-
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reasoning employed by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re
Hoery.21 Part V critically analyzes the court's opinion.2 2 Finally, Part
VI explores the potential impact of this decision. 23
II. FACTS
Lowry Air Force Base (Lowry) was an active military base from
the 1940s until September 1994.24 During that time, the United
States used the base as a disposal site for toxic chemicals, including
trichloroethylene (TCE).25 TCE is a colorless cleaning solvent that
can cause significant health problems, including nervous system
damage and even death.2 6 As a result of imprudent disposal, TCE
leached into the groundwater creating plumes of toxic pollution
that spread underground for several miles north of Lowry.27
In 1993, Robert Hoery bought a residence in the East Mont-
clair neighborhood of Denver, Colorado, seven blocks north of
Lowry. 28 The TCE plume emitted from Lowry extended under
nomic damages see infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text. For a full discus-
sion of Colorado case law, see infra notes 101-18 and accompanying text.
21. For a full discussion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 11947 and
accompanying text.
22. For a critical analysis of the court's decision, see infra notes 179-89 and
accompanying text.
23. For a full discussion of the impact of In re Hoery, see infra notes 190-99 and
accompanying text.
24. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d 214, 216 (Colo. 2003) (reporting United States
used Lowry as Air Force base from 1940s to 1994). Today, Lowry operates as an
administrative center for the Air Force. See Strategic-Air-Command.com, available
at: http://www.strategic-air-command.com/bases/Lowry_AFB.htm (last visited
Jan. 20, 2005). Lowry encompasses 1,866 acres southeast of Denver, Colorado.
Ecology at Lowry: Clean-up Sites, available at- http://www.lowry.org/ecology/cleanup
_sites.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
25. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 216 (noting Air Force discharged TCE between
1940s - 1994). The United States dumped the TCE into landfills on the base. See
id. According to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR):
Trichloroethylene is a mild skin, eye, and respiratory tract irritant. Inhala-
tion or ingestion of trichloroethylene can produce CNS [Central Nervous
System] effects including headache, dizziness, lack of coordination, stu-
por, and coma. Respiratory depression or cardiac dysrhythmia from
high-level exposures can result in death. Other effects of acute exposure
include hypotension, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea.
Medical Management Guidelines (MMGs) for Trichloroethylene (C12C=CHCI), available at.
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/M ... HMI/mmgl9.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2004).
26. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), ToxFAQsfor
Trichloroethlene (TCE), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfactsl9.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 8, 2003) (describing possible health risks); see also, Richtel, supra note 4
(reporting new EPA research show TCE "5 to 65 times as toxic as previously
thought").
27. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 216 (explaining extent of pollution).
28. Id. (noting proximity of Lowry to Hoery's property).
[Vol. XVI: p. 35
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Hoery's property and contaminated his groundwater well. 29 In
1997, the United States confirmed the presence of TCE in Hoery's
well at four times the maximum level allowed by Colorado law.30
Although the United States stopped dumping TCE at Lowry in
1994, this pollutant continued to migrate into Hoery's groundwater
and soil on a daily basis. 31 Moreover, the United States had taken
no corrective action. 32
In 1998, Hoery filed a FTCA claim against the United States.33
He alleged the United States was negligent when it released the
TCE that contaminated his property.3 4 Further, he contended the
United States was liable for continuing trespass and continuing nui-
sance because it failed to abate the pollution. 35 In response the
United States filed a motion to dismiss the claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.3 6
29. See Lowry: Ecology - Cleanup Sites, available at http://www.lowry.org/ecol-
ogy/cleanup-sites.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2004) (describing origin and direction
of TCE plume); see also In re Hoey, 64 P.3d at 216 (describing property). "The well
is approximately forty-eight feet deep and pumps underground water in the allu-
vial material above the Denver Aquifer." In re Hoery, 64 P.2d at 216 n.1. The well
water is used to irrigate the Hoery's lawn and vegetable garden. See id. at 216.
30. In re Hoery, 64 P.2d 214, 216 n.2 (Colo. 2003) (establishing facts of case).
The 1997 test, conducted by the United States, detected TCE in groundwater sam-
ples from Hoery's well at 20 micrograms per liter. The State of Colorado maxi-
mum contaminate level for TCE in drinking water is 5 micrograms per liter. See id.
(citing Memorandum from Versar Inc. to Lowry Air Force Base (Aug. 19, 1997)).
31. See id. at 216 (reporting daily migration of TCE onto Hoery's property).
32. See id. (establishing defendant took no corrective action). Hoery's expert
hydrologist testified in his affidavit that, based on the information available in
1999, the contamination was not permanent. Id. at 216 n.4. Additionally, he testi-
fied, remediation strategies could restore the property. Id. The court recognized,
"the record at this stage of the litigation indicates that the contamination is not
permanent - that is, it is remediable or abatable." Id. at 222-23. The court de-
clared, however, "[wie express no opinion nor were we asked to define the legal
standards to apply the factual determination of whether the continued migration
and ongoing presence of the toxic pollution can be abated." Id. at 223 n.12. Ac-
cording to EPA, remediation strategies have been underway at the Lowry site since
1994 when the Record of Decision (ROD) formally identified the cleanup plan for
the Lowry Landfill site. See Region 8 - Lowry Landfill infra note 50. Generally, the
strategy is to "contain migration of contaminants." Id. For detailed information of
corrective strategies, see United States Environmental Protection Agency, September
30, 2002 Five Year Review Addendum, available at http://www.epa.gov/region8.super
fund/sites/co/lowry5yr.html.
33. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 216 (describing basis of action). For a more
detailed discussion of the FTCA, see infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
34. In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 216 (outlining claims). He alleged that the TCE
contaminated his property, including his ground water, soil and well. Id. Negli-
gence is a required element of a claim against the United States according to the
FTCA. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (2004).
35. See In re Hoey, 64 P.3d 214, 216 (Colo. 2003) (reciting Hoery's initial
claims).
36. See id. (noting United States' motion to dismiss).
2005]
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The district court granted the government's motion for two
reasons. 37 First, it concluded Hoery's permanent tort claims were
time barred and subsequently dismissed them for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.38 Second, the district court held Colorado case
law limited the United States' liability for nuisance and trespass to
the actual release of TCE; therefore, liability did not extend to the
continued migration and ongoing presence of TCE on Hoery's
property.39
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Hoery ar-
gued the continued migration and ongoing presence of TCE on his
property constituted continuing torts under Colorado case law.40
In response, the United States contended the alleged torts were
permanent and, therefore, time barred under Colorado law. 4 1 The
Tenth Circuit discerned no clear precedent and suspended the pro-
ceedings pending the Colorado Supreme Court's answer to two cer-
tified questions. 42 The questions were as follows:
37. See id. at 216-17 (explaining district court's reasoning).
38. See id. at 216 (reciting district court's reasoning). The district court held
Hoery's claims were time-barred under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1). Id.
Permanent tort claims accrue either when the injury first occurs or when the
plaintiff learned or should have learned of his injury and the cause, which ever
happens later. See id. at 216-17 (citations omitted). Comparatively, claims for con-
tinuing torts accrue as long as the tortious conduct continues. See id. The "plain-
tiff's recovery is limited to the statute of limitations period dating back from when
plaintiffs complaint was filed." Id. at 217 (citation omitted). "Because a two year
statute of limitations applies to FTCA claims, the District Court held that Hoery's
1998 claims were untimely because Hoery knew or should have known his property
might be contaminated by TCE from Lowry as of 1995." Id. Hoery did not appeal
that ruling." Id. (citation omitted).
39. See id. at 217 (recounting District Court's holding). Under the FTCA, the
government is liable "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2004). The District Court reasoned that
no continuing tort had been alleged because "the only 'wrongful act' alleged by
Hoery was the actual release of toxic chemicals by the United States," and this act
ended in September 1994. In re Hoey, 64 P.3d at 217 (explaining District Court's
holding). In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on two of Colo-
rado's "irrigation ditch cases": Middelkamp v. Bessemer Irrigating Ditch Co., 103 P. 280
(Colo. 1909) and Hickman v. N. Sterling Irrigation Dist., 748 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App.
1987). Id. (citing cases district court relied on). For further discussion of the irri-
gation ditch cases, see infra notes 106-10 and corresponding text.
40. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003) (recounting Hoery's argu-
ment on appeal). Hoery cited Wright v. Ulrich, 91 P. 43 (Colo. 1907), in which the
court held the statute of limitations did not preclude the plaintiffs claim because
noises and smells emanating from an adjacent slaughterhouse constituted a con-
tinuing nuisance. See Wright, 91 P. at 43-44.
41. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 217 (recounting United States' argument on
appeal).
42. See id. (stating outcome of appeal).
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(1) Does the continued migration of toxic chemicals from
defendant's property to plaintiff's property, allegedly
caused by chemical releases by the defendant, consti-
tute continuing trespass and/or nuisance under Colo-
rado law?
(2) Does the continued presence of those chemicals on
plaintiff's property constitute continuing trespass
and/or nuisance under Colorado law?
4 3
The Colorado Supreme Court granted review and explained:
"the continuing migration and ongoing presence of toxic chemicals
originally emanating from Lowry constitute a continuing trespass
and nuisance."44 It answered both certified questions affirmatively
and returned the case to the Tenth Circuit.45
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Roles of CERCLA and FTCA as Instruments for Private
Plaintiff Recovery of Economic Loss
1. CERCLA
CERCLA was enacted in December 1980, during the last days
of the Carter Administration.46 CERCLA imposed a tax on the
chemical and petroleum industries creating a "Superfund."47 The
Superfund proceeds would be used to clean up abandoned and in-
active hazardous waste sites. 48 CERCLA was "designed to provide
for cleanup of abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites, and
43. See id. at 220 (identifying certified questions) (emphasis added).
44. See id. at 221-22 (answering certified questions).
45. See id. at 223 (presenting conclusion).
46. See Gerald W. Boston & M. Stuart Madden, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
Toxic TORTS 557 (2d ed. 2001) (describing circumstances surrounding
enactment).
47. See id. (stating how CERCLA works).
48. See id. (explaining legislative intent). According to Boston and Madden:
Although the legislative history of CERCLA... is not a paragon of clarity,
it is nonetheless clear that one of Congress' primary objectives was 'assur-
ing that those responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury
from chemical poison bear the costs of their actions. See S. Rep. No. 848
at 13, to S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The objective of providing
toxic tort compensation (such as for personal injury or emotional distress
or medical monitoring damages) contained in earlier versions of the bill
was deleted as part of last-minute compromises, in exchange for the es-
tablishment of a study group . . . to examine toxic tort laws and deter-
mine if a federal tort compensation system was justified. CERCIA
§ 301 (e).
Boston & Madden, supra note 46, at 557-58.
20051
7
Coleman: In Re Hoery v. United States: Compensating Homeowners for Loss of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
42 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XVI: p. 35
to assign liability to the responsible parties for those cleanup
costs."
4 9
In 1994, after approximately a decade of investigation, EPA
placed the Lowry Landfill on its NPL, which made it eligible for
Superfund remediation. 50 Over several decades, "millions of gal-
lons of industrial waste [had been] dumped into unlined pits" at
the landfill.5 1 The chemicals leached into the groundwater supply
and several contaminated "groundwater plumes" emerged, creating
a public health risk.52 The main plume, created by poor storage
and disposal techniques, ran beneath Hoery's property. 53
In August 2002, the Air Force contrated most of the environ-
mental cleanup efforts to a private organization, the Lowry Redevel-
opment Authority (LRA).5 4 As a result, the Air Force maintained
49. Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First Three Decades in the United
States, 20 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 75, 83 (2001); see also, Boston & Madden supra note 46, at
557 (discussing objective of Act). Specifically, Boston and Madden note:
Unlike most of the other major environmental statutes, its objective is not
largely regulatory in the sense of command and control regulation al-
though CERCLA does contain some regulatory provisions. It is designed
instead to establish rules of liability upon certain classes of actors for the
necessary costs of undertaking cleanups, and to establish measures of
compensation of those who have in fact undertaken the cleanup of sites
where hazardous substances have been released or are threatened to be
released.
Id.
Put another way, CERCLA "regulates the remediation of all hazardous sub-
stance releases - whether resulting from an accidental spill or an intentional dis-
charge as well as provides the federal government with a scheme for assigned
liability." Reed Cornia, Note, Westling v. County of Mille Lacs: Property Values, CER-
CLA, and Contamination Taxes, 7 Wis. ENvTL. L.J. 197, 199 (2000) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601, 9608 (1994)).
50. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Lowry Landfill, availa-
ble at http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/sites/co/lowry_.html (Apr. 2002)
(summarizing background of Lowry Landfill Superfund site) [hereinafter Region 8
- Lowry Landfill].
51. Id. (explaining duration and nature of toxic chemical dumping at Lowry).
52. Lowry: Ecology - Cleanup Sites, supra note 29. According to EPA, "ground-
water is used for drinking water by more than 50% of the people in the United
States, including almost all rural residents. The largest use for groundwater is to
irrigate crops." Id. EPA emphasizes, however, that Denver's drinking water supply
comes from high mountain snow melt so the contaminated groundwater from
Lowry is not consumed as drinking water. Id.
53. Id. (describing origin and direction of TCE plume). Specifically, EPA de-
scribes it as "flow[ing] northward under households in the East Montclair Neigh-
borhood." Id. The plume runs five to forty feet beneath ground. Id.
54. Id. (noting recent privatization of cleanup efforts). While it is unclear
why the Air Force decided to privatize much of its clean-up efforts, one possibility
is to "promote the economic redevelopment" of the area. See generally Superfund
Cleanup Figures, available at- http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/process/
mgmtrpt.htm (last updated Oct. 21, 2003) (noting by end of FY 2000, "more than
8
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ultimate liability for the cleanup while the LRA assumed manage-
ment responsibility for cleaning up the groundwater plume invad-
ing Hoery's property.55  According to the EPA, the LRA
implemented two cleanup systems to treat contaminated ground
water in the main plume: (1) a groundwater extraction system; and
(2) a series of wells that withdraw contaminated water, re-injecting
clean water. 56
CERCLA does not permit recovery for economic loss; there-
fore, homeowners adversely affected by the pollution cannot re-
ceive compensation through Superfund for any depreciation of
property value.57 Under section 107(a) (4) (B), a plaintiff may re-
cover the "necessary costs of response incurred ... consistent with
the national contingency plan."5 8 Thus, a private plaintiff can only
obtain relief to the extent it incurred "costs of response."5 9
Cost of response is defined as the cost of both removal and
remedial action. 60 Therefore, damages for personal injury and eco-
nomic damages, such as loss of property value, are not recoverable
under CERCLA.61 Scholars have noted that CERCLA is comple-
mentary to the law of toxic torts because it concentrates on liability
and compensation. 62 Accordingly, when private plaintiffs suffer a
32,000 sites have been removed from the CERCLIS [Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Contamination, and Liability Information System] waste site list to
help promote the economic redevelopment of these properties").
55. See Lowry: Ecology - Cleanup Sites, supra note 29 (explaining allocation of
responsibility between LRA and EPA under clean-up agreement).
56. See id. (listing two clean-up systems); Region 8 - Lowry Landfil, supra note
50 (noting two initial clean-up measures). EPA acknowledges these are only "'in-
terim' measures, and additional treatment techniques will be necessary to clean up
contaminated groundwater." Lowry: Ecology - Cleanup Sites, supra note 29. Addi-
tionally, remedial action was recommended for one residence because of the "pos-
sibility that TCE, in a gaseous state, could rise through the soil into the basements
of existing homes over the plume and create a health risk for residents." Id.
57. See HYSON, supra note 2, at 189-91 (explaining economic loss not recover-
able under CERCLA).
58. See id. at 189 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B), ELR STAT. CERCLA
§ 107(a) (4) (B)) (quotations omitted).
59. See id. at 190 (stating limited grounds for relief).
60. Id. (explaining term 'response' is defined to include 'removal' and 'reme-
dial action'). Both 'removal' and 'remedial action' are understood to include the
element of necessity. Id.
61. See id. at 190-91. "Plaintiffs may not recover, as 'costs of response,' dam-
ages for economic or personal injury." Id.
62. Boston & Madden, supra note 46, at 557 (recognizing similar goal of CER-
CLA and toxic tort law).
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loss in property value due to close proximity of a Superfund site,
they must seek economic relief, under state tort law. 63
2. FTCA
In 1948, Congress created the FTCA as "a uniform, systematic
and exclusive remedy for the torts of federal agencies." 64 It was de-
signed both to protect federal employees from personal tort liability
actions in the context of their employment and to provide an ave-
nue of redress against the United States for injured individuals. 65
Under the FTCA, the federal government may be held liable under
state law where, under the same circumstances, a private individual
would be held liable.66 Liability is determined according to "the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred."67 Accord-
ingly, when a plaintiff brings a tort action, state law determines
whether the alleged tort was continuing or permanent.68
A two-year statute of limitations applies to all FTCA claims. 69
This requirement becomes problematic in the environmental con-
63. See HysON supra note 2, at 191, 228 n.16 (recognizing although economic
recovery barred under CERCLA, "[p]laintiffs may, of course, seek to recover such
damages in a separate claim based upon state law").
64. Peak v. Small Bus. Admin., 660 F.2d 375, 378 (8th Cir. 1981). The FTCA
replaced the "sue and be sued" approach established by the Court in 1939. See id.
at 377. "In Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381, 59 S. Ct. 516 (1939), the Supreme
Court held that a 'sue and be sued' federal agency could be sued for its torts. In
subsequently passing the FrCA, Congress withdrew this right to sue federal agen-
cies in tort under. . . 'sue and be sued' statutes." Id. Accordingly, "if no recovery
is allowed under the EITCA for an action sounding in tort, there is simply no rem-
edy afforded." Peak, 660 F.2d at 378.
65. See 35A Am. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 7 (2001) (explaining legisla-
tive intent).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2004) (explaining federal liability). Section 2674 states:
"[t]he United States shall be liable ... in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances .... " Id. Under the FTCA, a tort
action brought against the United States may proceed when the injury is:
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his [her] office or em-
ployment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
See Hall v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 825 F. Supp. 427, 429-430 (D.N.H.
1993) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
67. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2004).
68. See, e.g., In re Hoery, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003). "Because the acts al-
leged here occurred in Colorado, our precedent controls as to whether the allega-
tions constitute a continuing trespass and nuisance." Id.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2004). Section 2401(b) provides in pertinent part:
"A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented
in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim ac-
crue[.]" Id. (emphasis added).
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text because many environmental violations are not discovered
within the requisite two-years. 70 In this context, the distinction be-
tween continuing and permanent torts is crucial because it deter-
mines when the statute of limitations begins to run.71 Under the
FTCA, a permanent tort claim accrues for limitations purposes
when the injury first occurs or when the plaintiff learned or should
have learned of his injury and its cause. 72 A continuing tort claim
accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run only when the
harmful condition is removed. 73 Whether an alleged tortious act is
classified as permanent or continuing depends on the state's inter-
pretation of the continuing tort doctrine.7 4 The continuing tort
doctrine effectively extends the statute of limitations; therefore,
each state must balance the countervailing concerns of equity and
public policy against the benefits of stricter limitations periods.75
"Statute of limitations serve three primary functions: 1) to ensure fairness to
defendants; 2) to promote judicial efficiency; and 3) to promote social stability."
Albert C. Lin, Comment: Application of the Continuing Torts Doctrine to Environmental
Law, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 723, 755 (1996) (citing Developments in the Law - Statute of
Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950) [hereinafter Developments]); see
also MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 590-91 (explaining statute of limitations primary
purposes). MacAyeal suggests "the principal purpose [of statutes of limitations]
appears to be to prevent the assertion [s] of stale claims." Id. at 592.
70. See MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 592 (addressing timeliness requirement
problem).
71. See generally MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 589, 618-19 (articulating interplay
between statute of limitations and continuing tort doctrine). "The practical signifi-
cance of the continuing tort concept is that, for statute of limitation purposes, the
claim does not begin to accrue until the tortious conduct has ceased." In re Hoery,
64 P.3d at 218 (citing Fowler v. Harper et al., THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.7 (3d ed.
1996)). In other words, "the statute of limitations begins to run only when the
defendant abates the nuisance and removes the cause of damage." Decision, Colo-
rado Supreme Court Holds Unabated Hazardous Waste Migration Is Continuous Tort:
Robert N. Hoery v. United States, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J.,June 2003, at 16
[hereinafter Decision] (explaining Hoery court's reasoning and holding).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2004) (establishing accrual point for permanent tort
claims).
73. Id. (explaining accrual point for continuing tort claims). Put another
way,
The ordinary trespass is complete when it is committed; the cause of ac-
tion accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run at that time...
But in many cases, as where the defendant erects a structure or dumps
rubbish upon the land of the plaintiff, the invasion is continued by a
failure to remove it. In such cases, there is a continuing wrong so long as
the offending object remains.
W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 13.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2004) (deferring to state law).
75. See Lin, supra note 69, at 756 (citing Developments, supra note 69, at 1200-
20051
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B. The Continuing Tort Doctrine as a Method of Recovery for
Economic Damages
In civil environmental penalty actions, plaintiffs frequently en-
counter time-based problems due to the unique nature of hazard-
ous pollution. 76 The continuing tort doctrine offers plaintiffs the
means to overcome these obstacles.77 "Under the continuing tort
doctrine, a statute of limitations does not begin to run until a series
of tortious acts has ceased."78 In other words, "the statute of limita-
tions begins to run only when the nuisance is abated and the cause
of damage removed." 79 To establish a continuing tort, the plaintiff
must show a "substantial nexus" between the violations outside and
within the limitations period.80 If the violations are "sufficiently re-
lated" they are treated as one continuous violation and the statute
of limitations will not be tolled because the tortious act has not
ceased."'
To explain the distinction between permanent and continuing
torts, some jurisdictions focus on either the "'cause' of the harm or
the 'harm' resulting from that cause."82 For example, in Breiggar
Prop., L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc.,83 the Utah Supreme Court
looked exclusively at the act constituting the trespass and not the
resulting harm.8 4 Conversely, in Wood v. American Aggregates Corp,8 5
the Ohio Court of Appeals emphasized the resulting harm of the
76. See Boston & Madden supra note 46, at 879 (recognizing common
problems encountered by plaintiffs); see also, MacAyeal supra note 7, at 589 (ex-
plaining unique nature of toxic pollution).
77. See generally MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 641 (advocating application of con-
tinuing violation doctrine to environmental violations).
78. MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 618. The "significance of the designation 'con-
tinuing trespass' is primarily that of relieving some of the strictures of limitations
periods within which the possessor would have to bring a toxic tort claim." Boston
& Madden, supra note 46, at 24 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 161
cmt. b. (1963)).
The continuing tort doctrine is invoked in a variety of legal arenas, including
environmental law, employment discrimination law, anti-trust law and criminal
law. See Lin, supra note 69, at 745-55 (discussing and comparing continuing torts
within environmental law, employment discrimination law, criminal law and anti-
trust law).
79. See Decision, supra note 71, at 16.
80. See MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 636 (explaining continuing tort test).
81. Id. (stating effect of satisfied test).
82. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d 214, 219 n.8 (Colo. 2003) (recognizing alternate
methods of clarification and comparing Breiggar Prop., L. C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons,
Inc., 52 P.3d 1133, 1135 (Utah 2002), with Wood v. Amer. Aggregates Corp., 585
N.E.2d 970, 973 (Oh. App. 1990)).
83. 52 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2002).
84. Id. at 1135 (considering act not harm).
85. 585 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Oh. App. 1990).
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trespass.86 This may be a distinction without a difference because
the cause of the harm and the harm itself are usually linked.8 7
A number ofjurisdictions have held that "even if the condition
causing the contamination has ceased, provided the contamination
remains on the plaintiff's land or continues to migrate onto the
plaintiffs land, the defendant remains liable for a continuing
tort."88 For example, in Arcade Water Dist. v. United States,89 Arcade
sued the United States under the FTCA for contamination of its
water well by a military laundry.90 Although the laundry was closed
in 1973, contaminants continued to enter Arcade's well ten years
later.91 The Ninth Circuit determined that "the most salient allega-
tion was that contamination continued to leach into Arcade's
well."
9 2
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an actor's
failure to remove a thing tortiously placed on another's land is con-
sidered a "continuing trespass" for the duration of the time the
thing is wrongfully on the land.93 Liability for the continuing tres-
pass remains until the thing placed on or underneath the land is
removed.94 Many jurisdictions, have adopted the Restatement defi-
nition of continuing trespass in environmental contamination suits
86. Id. at 973 (focusing on continuing damages not conduct).
87. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 219, n.8 (noting classifications are "unhelpful to
our analysis" because "it is difficult to determine whether the toxic pollution
plume is the cause of Hoery's alleged harm or the harm itself").
88. Id. at 221.
89. 940 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1991).
90. See id. at 1266 (explaining facts).
91. Id. (noting continued leaching of chemicals).
92. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d 214, 221 (Colo. 2003) (recounting Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Arcade).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 cmt. b.(1977) The full text is as
follows:
The actor's failure to remove from land in the possession of another a
structure, chattel, or other thing which he has tortiously erected or
placed on the land constitutes a continuing trespass for the entire time
during which the thing is wrongfully on the land and... confers on the
possessor of the land an option to maintain a succession of actions based
on the theory of continuing trespass or to treat the continuance of the
thing on the land as an aggravation of the original trespass.
Id.
94. See 75 Am. JUR. 2D Trespass § 26 (2002) (defining duration of liability).
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on the condition that the injury is reasonably abatable. 95 Whether
an injury is reasonably abatable is a question of fact.96
Courts have embraced the abatement test because it promotes
public policy. 97 In Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc.,98 the Maine Su-
preme Court concluded that application of the abatement test in
toxic tort cases "encourages abatement by the responsible party, an
important public policy consideration. '" 99 Further, it noted: "if we
were to exclude from [the abatement] test environmental contami-
nation cases the effect would be to grant defendants the equivalent
of an easement, thereby reducing significantly the chances that the
hazardous materials would be cleaned up."100
C. Colorado Case Law
In 1894, Colorado first recognized continuing tort claims in In
Consol. Home Supply Ditch Co. v. Hamlin.01 This principle was firmly
reestablished thirteen years later in Wright v. Ulrich.10 2 In Wright,
95. See Dana L. Eismeier, Esq., Continuing Trespass And Nuisance, Presented at
October 2002 Colorado Municipal League Conference, available at: http://www.
burnsfigawill.com/articles/Eismeier/continuingtrespass.htm (last visited Aug. 3,
2003); MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 619 (noting some courts indicate doctrine only
applies when source of injury is abatable or remediable).
Cases applying the "reasonable abatement" test include: Magini v. Aerojet-
General Corp., 912 P.2d 1220, 1226 (Cal. 1996); Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 94
F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1996); Middelkamp v. Bessemer Irrigation Ditch Co., 102 P.
280, 283 (Colo. 1909).
96. See, e.g., Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc., 676 A.2d 504 (Me. 1996) (up-
holding abatability test and concluding feasibility of remediation was factual issue).
The Colorado Supreme Court did not address this issue because it was not before
them. See In reHoey, 64 P.3d 214, 222 n.12 (Colo. 2003). "We express no opinion
nor were we asked to define the legal standards to apply to a factual determination
of whether the continued migration and ongoing presence of the toxic pollution
can be abated." Id. The court explained further:
The record does not indicate that the continued migration or ongoing
presence of toxic pollution plumes underneath Hoery's residential prop-
erty will or should continue indefinitely. Rather, the record at this stage
of the litigation indicates that the contamination is not permanent - that
is, it is remediable or abatable. Although the United States did not ad-
dress the factual issue, Hoery's expert opined under oath that Hoery's
property could be remediated.
Id. at 222-23.
97. See, e.g., Jacques, 676 A.2d at 504 (explaining public policy rationale).
98. 676 A.2d 504 (Me. 1996). The subject of the court's inquiry was the
dumping of hazardous materials at a former lagoon dump site partially situated on
plaintiffs property. Id. Because there was an issue of fact as to whether the con-
taminants were abatable, summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. at 507.
99. Id. at 508.
100. Id.
101. 40 P. 582 (Colo. 1894).
102. Wright v. Ulrich, 91 P. 43 (Colo. 1907) (recognizing continuing nuisance
under Colorado law).
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the plaintiff brought suit to restrain the defendant from operating a
slaughterhouse adjacent to the plaintiff's residence. 10 3 After con-
cluding that the noises and smells emanating from the defendant's
property were a nuisance, the Colorado Supreme Court held the
defendant was liable for damages until he abated the nuisance by
removing the slaughterhouse. 10 4 Wright reasoned that the plain-
tiff's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations because "the
continuing of a trespass or nuisance from day to day is considered
in law a several trespass on each day."10 5
Two years later, the Supreme Court of Colorado clarified the
elements of a continuing tort by distinguishing it from a permanent
tort claim in Middelkamp v. Bessemer Irrigating Ditch Co. 10 6 In Mid-
delkamp, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the defendant's ir-
rigation ditch was a permanent improvement and, therefore,
distinguishable from the abatable nuisance in Wright.10 7
Middlekamp set forth two reasons for distinguishing an irriga-
tion ditch from a slaughterhouse. 10 8 First, unlike a slaughterhouse,
irrigation ditches are designed to be permanent and to seep
water.109 Second, when irrigation ditches are lawfully constructed,
they represent "a class of enterprises ... vital to the future develop-
ment and prosperity of our state[.]"110
The Colorado Supreme Court applied Middlecamp's concept of
permanent torts to the construction and maintenance of railway
lines in Denver & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hannegan.111 The Colorado
Supreme Court explained that "[s]imilar to the context of irriga-
103. See id. at 43 (setting forth facts of case).
104. See id. at 44 (holding nuisance was continuing tort) (citing Consol.
Home Supply Ditch Co. v. Hamlin, 40 P. 582 (Colo. App. 1894)).
105. See Hoeyy, 64 P.3d 214, 219 (Colo. 2003) (quoting Wright, 91 P. at 43).
106. 103 P. 280 (Colo. 1909).
107. See id. at 284 (distinguishing Wright on abatement grounds).
108. See id. at 285 (explaining rationale).
109. Id. at 282 (describing permanent nature of irrigation ditch).
110. Id. at 284 (enumerating irrigation ditch's social/economic benefits).
Further, "it is well settled that a work which is authorized by law cannot be a nui-
sance, and that a public nuisance cannot exist in acts which are authorized by
legislative sanction, even though the act complained of might; independent of stat-
ute, be a nuisance." Id. at 282; see also Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 196 P.
334 (Colo. 1921); Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Bennett, 156 P. 604, 609 (Colo. 1916).
111. 127 P. 343, 345 (Colo. 1908) (applying permanent tort concept to rail-
ways). The plaintiff lived alongside the railway line and sued for continuing tres-
pass. Id. at 344. The court reasoned that, because both the permanent nature of
the railway line and legal authority necessary to build, the plaintiffs could only
recover for permanent interference with their land. Id. at 345. Accordingly, the
court held the statute of limitations began to run when the railroad first began to
occupy the street. See id.
2005]
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tion ditches, defendants who lawfully constructed and maintained
railway lines represented an enterprise that was vital to the future
development of the state."' 1 2 Nearly two decades later, in Wilmore v.
Chain O'Mines, Inc.,113 the Colorado Supreme Court applied the
continuing nuisance doctrine where the defendant had discharged
pollution into a creek used for irrigation." 14
In summary, Colorado courts have recognized the distinction
between continuing and permanent torts for nearly a century."15
One key distinguishing factor is whether the trespass or nuisance is
outweighed by a larger economic or social benefit."16 While the
Colorado Supreme Court had recognized the concepts of continu-
ing and permanent torts, "[it had] not addressed an environmental
contamination case where the contamination remains and contin-
ues to migrate onto the plaintiffs property, but where the cause of
the contamination has ceased." 7 Thus, the Colorado courts had
not previously addressed the particular facts and issues presented in
the present case.118
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In In re Hoery, the Colorado Supreme Court considered several
elements while determining whether the ground water pollution
was a continuing tort. 119 First, the court surveyed the torts of tres-
pass and nuisance. 120 Second, it distinguished between continuing
and permanent torts using two key factors: (1) whether the contam-
ination was remediable or abatable; and (2) whether the pollution
was socially or economically beneficial. 121 Third, the court weighed
public policy considerations. 122 After applying this analytical frame-
work, the court determined the ongoing presence and continued
112. In reHoery, 64 P.3d 214, 220 (Colo. 2003) (explaining benefit to state was
characteristic shared by irrigation ditches and railroads).
113. 44 P.2d 1024 (Colo. 1935).
114. Id. at 1028 (holding pollution discharged into creek constituted continu-
ing nuisance).
115. See In re Hoey, 64 P.3d at 218 (noting Colorado courts recognized claims
for continuing torts since Wright in 1907).
116. See id. at 219 (recognizing social/economic benefit rationale).
117. See id. at 221.
118. See id. (acknowledging facts and issue created matter of first impression).
119. See generally In re Hoery, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003).
120. See id. at 217 (explaining elements of trespass and nuisance). For a fur-
ther discussion of the court's review of trespass and nuisance, see infra notes 124-
28 and accompanying text.
121. See id. For a full discussion of the court's review of continuing and per-
manent torts, see infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
122. See id. at 219.
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migration of TCE into Hoery's groundwater and soil was a continu-
ing tort.123
A. Trespass and Nuisance
The Colorado Supreme Court began its analysis by describing
the underlying torts of trespass and nuisance. 124 In doing so, it re-
lied on both case law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts.1 25
Trespass is defined as "a physical intrusion upon the property of
another without the proper permission from the person legally en-
titled to possession of that property."' 26 This intrusion may occur
when the actor places "a thing either on or beneath the surface of
the land." 127 Private nuisance is "a substantial invasion of an indi-
vidual's interest in the enjoyment and use of her property." 128
B. Continuing and Permanent Torts
The court then addressed the distinction between permanent
and continuing torts. 129 It explained:
Colorado law recognizes the concepts of continuing tres-
pass and nuisance for those property invasions where a de-
fendant fails to stop or remove continuing, harmful
physical conditions that are wrongfully placed on a plain-
tiff's land. The only exception is a factual situation - such
as an irrigation ditch or a railway line - where the prop-
123. See id. at 222 (concluding torts were continuing).
124. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 217 (reviewing elements of trespass and
nuisance).
125. See id. at 218 (setting forth basis for reasoning).
126. Id. at 217 (citing Public Serv. Co. of Colorado, 27 P.3d 371, 389 (Colo.
2001)). The court explained, "[a] landowner who sets in motion a force which, in
the usual course of events, will damage property of another is guilty of a trespass
on such property." See id. at 217 (citing Miller v. Carnation Co., 516 P.2d 661, 664
(Colo. App. 1973)).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158(a) cmt. i (1965). According to
the Second Restatement of Torts: "[iut is enough that an act is done with knowl-
edge that it will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of the foreign matter."
See id.
128. See In re Hoety, 64 P.3d at 218 (defining private nuisance) (citing Public
Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d at 391). Public nuisance is distinguisha-
ble from private nuisance as it covers the invasion of rights common all members
of the public. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 cmt. b. Here, the court
addressed only private nuisance. In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 218 n.5. Further, accord-
ing to the Restatement, harmful indirect or physical conditions created by the de-
fendant may also constitute a nuisance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834
cmt. b.
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erty invasion will and should continue indefinitely because
defendants, with lawful authority, constructed a socially
beneficial structure intended to be permanent. 13 0
The court carefully distinguished the present case from Middelcamp,
noting "[t]he record . . . indicates that the contamination is not
permanent - that is, it is remediable or abatable."1 31 Further, un-
like the irrigation ditch in Middelcamp or the railroad in Hannegan,
the continued migration and ongoing presence of TCE confers no
social or economic benefit to the state.132
C. Certified Questions
Next, the court turned to the certified questions before it:
(1) Does the continued migration of toxic chemicals from
defendant's property to plaintiffs property, allegedly
caused by chemical releases by the defendant, consti-
tute continuing trespass and/or nuisance under Colo-
rado law?
(2) Does the continued presence of those chemicals on
plaintiff's property constitute continuing trespass
and/or nuisance under Colorado law?133
Acknowledging it had never addressed these questions, the court
examined cases from other jurisdictions that addressed these is-
sues.134 The court found the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' rea-
soning in Arcade Water Dist. v. United States135 particularly instructive
because the facts were analogous.13 6 Further, it found the Ninth
130. Id. at 220.
131. Id. at 222-23.
132. See id. at 223 (distinguishing contamination from ditches).
133. See id. at 220 (stating certified questions) (emphasis added).
134. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 221 (consulting reasoning of other
jurisdictions).
135. 940 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1991) (addressing applicability of continuing
nuisance doctrine to ongoing leaching of chemical onto plaintiffs property).
136. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 221 (recognizing Arcade as analogous). In
Arcade, the plaintiff operated a public water supplying agency. Arcade, 940 F.2d at
1266. Defendant, the United States, operated an Army laundry facility at Camp
Kohler Annex, McClellan Air Force Base from 1941 until 1973. See id. During
those thirty-two years, the United States discharged chemical residues into the
ground. See id. These chemicals leached into "Well 31," which was owned and
operated by Arcade, and located approximately 2,000 feet from the laundry. See id.
Although the United States stopped discharging chemicals in 1973, subsequent
tests revealed continuous and ongoing leaching. Id. In 1984, Arcade sued the
United States under the FTCA, alleging continuing nuisance. Id. at 1266-67. The
district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred. See id. at 1267. On appeal,
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Circuit's analysis in Arcade "persuasive and consistent" with Colo-
rado precedent and the continuing tort doctrine.' 3 7 The Ninth Cir-
cuit explained: when characterizing a nuisance as continuing or
permanent, the relevant question is whether the contaminants con-
tinue to leach into the plaintiffs property.13 8 Applying this test, the
Colorado Supreme Court determined the continued migration and
continued presence of toxic chemicals constituted continuing torts
under Colorado law. 139
The court provided two grounds for its decision: (1) TCE's
ongoing presence on Hoery's property which was unabated by the
United States; and (2) TCE continued to migrate onto Hoery's
property unabated by the United States. 140 One's failure to act may
be the basis for tortious conduct; accordingly, the court found the
United States' failure to remedy the pollution constituted a contin-
uing tort.141 Following Arcade's reasoning, the court explained that
"it is immaterial whether the United States continues to release
toxic pollutants from Lowry."1 42
In summary, the court noted five reasons for reaching its con-
clusion. First, the TCE pollution is an ongoing presence and mi-
grates continuously onto Hoery's property.143 Second, the daily
migration and presence of TCE on Hoery's property constitute the
continuing tort.144 Third, the undisputed record shows that the
contamination is not permanent because it is abatable and remedia-
ble.145 Fourth, the pollution is neither socially nor economically
beneficial.' 46 Finally, public policy favors termination of the con-
the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that "the fact that the laundry [was] no longer
operating [was] not material." Id. at 1268.
137. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 221 (adopting Ninth Circuit's analysis).
138. See Arcade, 940 F.2d at 1268 (Reasoning, "the most salient allegation is
that contamination continues to leach into Arcade's Well 31.... [I]t is this leach-
ing of contaminants, not the operation of the laundry, that is relevant in character-
izing the nuisance.").
139. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 222 (concluding continued migration and
ongoing presence are continuing torts).
140. See id. (setting forth basis for decision).
141. See id. (determining defendant's liability).
142. Id.
143. See id. (holding, "these property invasions by way of trespass and nui-
sance are continuing").
144. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 222 (rejecting defendant's argument that tor-
tious conduct ceased when defendant stopped releasing TCE into ground).
145. See id. at 222-23. "[T]he record at this stage in the litigation indicates
that the contamination is not permanent - that is it is remediable or abatable." Id.
The court noted it was not addressing the factual determination of whether the
continued migration and ongoing presence could be abated. See id. at 223 n.12.
146. See id. at 222-23 (distinguishing irrigation ditch cases). The court em-
phasized that it found the irrigation ditches to be permanent because they were
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tinued migration and ongoing presence of TCE in Hoery's
property. 147
D. Dissenting Opinion
In his lengthy dissent, Justice Kourlis attacked several under-
pinnings of the majority's holding and reasoning. 148 Initially, he
acknowledged the historical difficulty of distinguishing between
permanent and continuing torts and identified two problems inher-
ent in making the distinction. 149 First, he argued it is difficult to
determine when the injury becomes actionable. 150 Second, it re-
mains difficult to "determine when and how the injury is
quantified." 5 1
Moreover, Justice Kourlis disagreed with the theory upon
which the majority distinguished between continuing and perma-
nent torts. 152 He outlined three theories of how permanent and
continuous torts are distinguishable. 153 The first emphasizes the
nature of the conduct. 154 The second emphasizes the nature of the
lawfully constructed and intended to be permanent; whereas "[t]he record does
not indicate that the continued migration or ongoing presence of toxic pollution
plumes underneath Hoery's residential property will or should continue indefi-
nitely." See id. at 222.
147. See id. at 223 (finding "that public policy favors the discontinuance of
both the continuing migration and the ongoing presence of toxic chemicals into
Hoery's property and irrigation well"). Additionally, the court reasoned that,
"[u] nder Colorado law, a tortfeasor's liability for continuing trespass and nuisance
creates a new cause of action each day the property invasion continues. Hence,
the alleged tortfeasor has an incentive to stop the property invasion and remove
the cause of damage." Id.
148. See id. at 223-29 (Kourlis,J., dissenting) (disagreeing with court's reason-
ing and decision).
149. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 224 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (asserting, "[t]wo
problems are inherent in the concept" of differentiating between continuing and
permanent trespass).
150. See id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (identifying first problem to be when in-
jury becomes actionable). This is important because it determines when the stat-
ute of limitations begins to run. See generally MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 590-92
(summarizing operation and purposes of statutes of limitations).
151. In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 224 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 224-26 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (proposing different theory
more appropriate).
153. See id. at 224-25 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (outlining three theories).
154. See id. at 224 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he first theory fo-
cuses on the nature of the conduct that caused the tort and labels as continuous
only torts that result from ongoing actions by the tortfeasor").
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injury.1 55 The third is result oriented.15 6 Justice Kourlis argued the
first approach is most appropriate and in accord with Colorado
law.15 7
Justice Kourlis reviewed the development of trespass law in Col-
orado and noted that equitable relief was typically awarded in con-
tinuous trespass cases. 158  He explained that "Itihe same
characteristics that render an injury difficult to quantify, also serve
to support a conclusion that the injury cannot be adequately re-
dressed at law."' 59 Accordingly, Justice Kourlis averred injunctive
relief is more appropriate than damages in continuing tort cases
because damages require "forecasting of injury" and are "impossi-
ble to speculate.' 60 Further, he cautioned that awarding damages
might result in a windfall for the plaintiff if the plaintiffs award
exceeds the actual loss of property value. 161
Justice Kourlis decried the majority's focus on "the nature of
the injuries" instead of the "character of [the trespasser's] ac-
tions."'162 He contended that this focus "divorce[d] the plaintiff's
claim from the Law of Torts and the principles that it serves."' 63
Further, he argued that the majority's opinion raises difficult ques-
tions. 164 In particular, he cited difficulty pinpointing when the stat-
ute of limitations may begin to accrue. 165 Justice Kourlis suggested
155. See id. at 225 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he second theory
looks... to the nature of the injury caused by the tort and concludes that a tort is
continuous when the damages are not capable of final assessment at the time the
action is filed").
156. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 225 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (noting some cases
distinguish between continuing and permanent torts from "result-oriented
stance").
157. See id. at 224 (KourlisJ., dissenting) (stating that "[i]n my view, the the-
ory that concentrates on the nature of the conduct of the tortfeasor is the one that
comports best with general tort law and with concepts of predictability and
deterrence").
158. See id. at 226-27 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (recalling history of equitable
relief for continuing trespass in Colorado).
159. Id. at 226 (Kourlis, J., dissenting). Justice Kourlis cited Wright and Wil-
more as cases where injunctive relief was granted to remedy continuing nuisance.
Id. at 226-27 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 226 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (arguing damage awards for continu-
ing tort is inappropriate because "impossible to speculate" future damages).
161. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 227(KourlisJ., dissenting) (warning where res-
toration costs considered in damages calculation plaintiff may receive windfall).
162. Id. at 223 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 228-29 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 228 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
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that it would be more appropriate for the legislature to carve out an
exception to the statute of limitations in toxic tort cases. 166
Finally, Justice Kourlis disagreed with the court's public policy
balancing test.167 He emphasized the importance of statutes of lim-
itation in environmental cases. 168 Justice Kourlis proposed the ben-
efits of statutes of limitation outweigh policy concerns because they
promote early discovery and remediation. 169
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In In re Hoery, the Colorado Supreme Court held ongoing mi-
gration and ongoing presence of a chemical pollutant constituted a
continuing tort under Colorado law.170 Further, it concluded that
failure to abate and remove the pollution constituted tortious con-
duct. 171 By endorsing the continuing tort doctrine, the court's de-
cision should increase compliance with environmental laws and
encourage the remedial goals of environmental legislation. 172
The court's rationale is public policy-laden, providing strong
support for its conclusions. 173 The majority notes that the underly-
ing principle of tort law is "to encourage socially beneficial conduct
and deter wrongful conduct.' 74 Classifying environmental pollu-
tion as a continuing tort provides the alleged tortfeasor with a
strong incentive to abate the invasion and remove the toxic pollu-
tants. 175 Under the continuing tort doctrine, potential tortfeasors
will be less likely to "run the risk of violating the law, with the hope
166. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 228 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (offering alterna-
tives approaches).
167. See id. at 229 (Kourlis, J., dissenting). "It seems to me that resting a tort
law distinction on the question of whether public policy would champion the de-
fendant or the plaintiff is unwise." Id.
168. See id. at 229 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
169. See id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (proposing statutes of limitation encour-
ages early discovery and remediation).
170. See id. at 216 (finding tort to be continuing).
171. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 216 (holding that United States failure to abate
was tortious conduct).
172. See generally MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 711 (concluding both discovery
rule and continuing tort doctrine are consistent with goals of statute of limitations
and environmental legislation); Boston & Madden, supra note 46, at 557. "Because
CERCLA concentrates on liability and compensation, it becomes complementary
to the law of toxic torts." Id.
173. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 219, 223 (explaining importance of public pol-
icy consideration); see generally MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 711-12 (suggesting doc-
trine encourages timely remediation and abatement).
174. See id. at 223 (citing Denver Publ'g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 897-98
(Colo. 2002)).
175. See id. at 223 (explaining incentive to tortfeasor for abatement).
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that the statute of limitations will expire before... EPA discovers
the violation."1 76
In the present case, Hoery bought his home one year before
Lowry was designated a Superfund site. 177 Despite preliminary
remediation steps, TCE continued to migrate into and contaminate
the nearby groundwater and soil.178 As a result, homeowners prob-
ably suffered a loss of property value. 179 Because CERCLA pre-
cludes recovery of economic damages, the only available recourse
for homeowners is through a tort action in the state courts. 180
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision follows the estab-
lished majority rule: "the damages or injury.., must be continuing,
as opposed to the tortious conduct."' 8' The Restatement supports
this view by focusing on the continuing harm resulting from the
actor's failure to remove the harmful thing.1 82 Thus, the dissent's
vehement cry, that the court has "divorce[d] the plaintiffs claim
from the Law of Torts and the principle it serves," appears
unfounded. t13
The dissent overemphasizes the tension between the statute of
limitations and the continuing tort doctrine.18 4 The primary goal
of the statute of limitations period is to discourage slow paced law-
suits based on stale evidence.' 85 By nature, many environmental
176. MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 711-12 (suggesting continuing tort doctrine
promotes abatement by tortfeasor).
177. See In re Hoey, 64 P.3d at 216 (stating chronology of events); UNITED
STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION AGENCY, Lowry Landfill, available at http://
www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/sites/co/lowry_.html (Apr. 2002) (summarizing
background of Lowry landfill site).
178. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 216 (Stating that "TCE remains on Hoery's
property and enters his groundwater and soil on a daily basis, unabated by the
United States").
179. See generally Property Values, supra note 5 (discussing correlation between
diminution in property value and close proximity to Superfund site).
180. See HYsON, supra note 2, at 191 n.16 (recognizing plaintiffs may seek
damages under state law); Glickman, supra note 3, at 852 (explaining that
"[recovery of damages not covered by CERCLA must be pursued in state court").
181. Id. (stating majority rule).
182. E.g. Boston & Madden, supra note 46, at 24-25 (setting forth portions of
Restatement which support view "that proof of continuing harm suffices to estab-
lish a continuing trespass"). For the full text of § 161 cmt. b, see supra note 93.
Section 161 (1) states: "A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on
the land of a structure, chattel, or other thing which the actor has tortiously placed
there, whether or not the actor has the ability to remove it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 161(1) (1963) (emphasis added).
183. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d 214, 223 (Colo. 2003) (Kourlis. J., dissenting).
184. See generally id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (emphasizing tension between
statute of limitations and continuing tort doctrine).
185. See MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 711 (stating one goal of limitations period
is avoiding stale evidence problem).
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violations occur over an extended period of time so stale evidence
is not an issue in these cases. 186 Accordingly, it does not, as the
dissent suggests, undermine the purpose of the statutes of
limitation. 187
In conclusion, the abatement test and public policy both sup-
port the continuing tort doctrine. 188 By upholding the continuing
tort doctrine, courts encourage compliance with environmental
standards.1 89 The Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Hoery fol-
lows established precedent, comports with the underlying purpose
of statutes of limitation, and furthers important public policy goals.
VI. IMPACT
Overall, this decision illuminates one possible avenue by which
homeowners and other private plaintiffs may recover economic
damages precluded by CERCLA. 190 If other courts choose to follow
Colorado's approach, they too will endorse compliance with cur-
rent environmental laws and promote remediation of toxic contam-
ination. 191 By increasing compliance with environmental laws,
courts help secure environmental protection which protects and
promotes the public interest. 192
186. See id. at 711 (explaining many environmental violations are continuous,
therefore, stale evidence problem generally not relevant concern).
187. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 229 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (concluding deci-
sion "undermines operation of statutes of limitation").
188. See MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 711 (explaining public policy promoted by
doctrine); cf Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 117-18 (2000) (identifying
factors favoring continuing classification). According to Dobbs, the six factors are:
(1) the invasion can in fact be terminated or abated; (2) the cost of termi-
nation is not wasteful or oppressive; (3) no privilege or public policy fa-
vors a continuation of the invasion; (4) incentive to abate the invasion
can be provided by permitting repeated suits for damages as they accrue;
and (5) the plaintiff prefers temporary damages; (6) overall, it is not just
to permit the defendant to acquire the permanent right to invade the
plaintiff's interests in land by paying market price for that right against
the plaintiffs wishes.
Id.
189. See generally MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 711 (explaining how continuing
tort doctrine encourages compliance with environmental law).
190. See In re Hoery, 64 P.3d at 227 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (recognizing out-
come of court's decision will permit plaintiffs to recover economic damages); Hy-
SON, supra note 2, at 191 n.16 (stating economic damages not recoverable under
CERCLA).
191. See generally MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 711 (concluding continuing tort
doctrine encourages compliance with environmental laws leading directly to envi-
ronmental protection).
192. See, e.g., MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 711-12 (endorsing proposition that
environmental protection is good public policy).
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Congress enacted CERCLA, in part, to ensure that those re-
sponsible for environmental contamination bear the cost of clean-
ing it up.193 It rejected a comprehensive liability scheme that would
enable private plaintiffs to recover for economic injuries. 194 While
Congress concluded that CERCLA should not be used to ensure
private recovery, CERCLA's underlying policy is: polluters must be
held accountable for their actions. 195 In the same spirit, polluters
should be required to reimburse private plaintiffs for the diminu-
tion in property value resulting from polluter's contamination.
Due to the large number of Superfund sites in the continental
United States, Hoery's situation is not unique.1 96 If courts in other
jurisdictions follow In re Hoey, it is likely that similar claims will be
filed across the country.' 97 The continuing tort doctrine furthers
the remedial goals of environmental protection statutes and pro-
motes compliance. 198 Therefore, courts should adopt the continu-
ing tort doctrine in civil environmental liability cases to compensate
homeowners for loss of property value and to encourage environ-
mental protection. 199
Elizabeth Ann Coleman
193. See HYSON, supra note 2, at 15 (outlining basic purposes of CERCLA).
194. See id. at 191 (recounting CERCLA's legislative history).
195. See id. at 15 (underscoring congressional intent).
196. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
197. See Richtel, supra note 4 .(reporting 1,499 Superfund sites nationwide in
January 2003).
198. MacAyeal, supra note 7, at 590 (arguing application of continuing tort
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